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《第一修正案》、大学调查与反以色列法律:法学教授对肯塔基大学的诉讼

来源:Reason 杂志发布 上传时间 (多伦多时间)1 家来源 · 1 篇报道

中文译文

本杰明·比顿法官(肯塔基州东区)在伍德科克诉卡皮卢托案中于周五作出的较长判决中的部分摘录:

本意见涉及关于拉姆西·伍德科克教授、其关于以色列和巴勒斯坦的评论,以及肯塔基大学对其是否违反第六条款或学校技术及行为准则所进行的调查这一持续事件的最新进展……

本月早些时候,本院驳回了法学教授拉姆西·伍德科克要求停止肯塔基大学对其就以色列-巴勒斯坦冲突所发表的若干评论以及其2025年“要求对以色列采取军事行动的请愿书”而进行的调查的请求。伍德科克最初的陈述未能令人信服地证明该调查是出于报复目的,或其持续进行会对他人造成压制效应。但该机构在两周后安排了一次证据听证会,以探讨这些基于事实的问题以及伍德科克提出的临时禁令申请。这项已持续一年多且报告早已逾期的调查,若不结束就会威胁到伍德科克的第一修正案权利,不可能“永远持续下去”。此外,肯塔基大学在调查期间让伍德科克暂停教学工作的决定也越来越难以辩解,尤其是考虑到并没有任何关于其扰乱课堂行为的明确怀疑……

在临时禁令决定作出一周后,那位外部调查员撰写的134页、目前仍被封存的报告终于送达。{该报告目前仍处于封存状态,等待关于封存申请的裁决,该申请将交由地方法官处理。}……目前,法学院院长可以决定是否取消对伍德科克的教学职务调整,让他能在春季学期重返课堂。据律师称,这一决定最迟可能在12月中旬作出,且不会影响伍德科克的授课能力……大学校长则可以根据调查报告来判断伍德科克是否违反了任何法律或规定……

该报告以及伍德科克的回应已由《肯塔基灯塔报》(麦克肯纳·霍斯利报道)刊登;伍德科克称,这是因为这些文件已作为相关州案件的公开材料被提交。对于伍德科克要求颁布临时禁令以阻止大学校长作出任何决定的请求,法院作出了如下回应:在之前的听证会上,本院认为,伍德科克试图终止其被调离教学岗位的安排,其依据比他要求停止调查本身的理由更为充分。这一观点主要基于相关判例法,这些判例法认可符合《第一修正案》要求的与言论相关的调查,但同时会考量此类调查是否因报复目的、压制言论或两者兼而有之而侵犯相关权利。{参见例如Sensabaugh v. Halliburton案(第六巡回法院,2019年)(在涉及“大量文件和短信”以及“17名不同证人”的“独立律师事务所”调查背景下,不存在基于“指导函”和斥责的负面措施);Moore v. Garnand案(第九巡回法院,2023年)(“我们从未认定单纯的报复性调查就会违反《第一修正案》,因为我们的裁决依据远不止报复性调查本身[.]”)。} …伍德科克坚称,第一修正案禁止总统花费“数周时间仔细研究”与“任何可争议的政策违规行为”无关的文件。“无论大学就春季教学做出何种决定,调查报告中的调查结果本身就会对伍德科克造成不可挽回的伤害。”伍德科克认为,如果审查涉及对其政治信仰的调查,那么这一程序就是非法的,应立即予以制止……

[但]大量判例表明,仅针对言论的调查通常不构成报复或不利行为。{参见,例如,Churchill诉科罗拉多大学博尔德分校案(科罗拉多州上诉法院,2010年)(“法院认为,仅进行调查本身并不构成不利雇佣行为”);Sensabaugh案(第六巡回法院,2019年)(即使背景中包含“痛苦的调查”,也不存在不利行为);Couch诉卡本县纪念医院董事会案(第十巡回法院)}2009年)(调查并不构成支持《第一修正案》所保障的报复行为的负面雇佣行为);Benningfield诉休斯顿市案(第五巡回法院,1998年)(“尽管训斥可能构成负面雇佣行为,但调查则不构成”);Moore案(“我们从未认定仅凭报复性调查就可能违反《第一修正案》”);Bell诉布劳沃德县警长案,1375号(第十一巡回法院,2021年)(“在对Bell副警长的行为进行调查期间对其实施的带薪停职五天的措施并非负面雇佣行为”)。但正如法院在之前的临时禁令意见中所强调的,该领域的判例法并不统一,不同巡回法院对于各种具体事实情形的处理方式仍存在不确定性。参见Holt诉宾夕法尼亚州案(第三巡回法院)。(2017))(“本法院尚未考虑启动内部调查是否可构成第一修正案报复索赔意义上的‘不利行为’,而其他同级法院对此问题存在分歧。”)相比之下,调查可能带来的附带后果可能会造成难以忍受的压制,从而需要司法干预。参见例如Levin v. Harleston案(第二巡回法院,1992年);White v. Lee案(第九巡回法院,2000年)。尽管涉嫌的违规行为可能与言论相关,第一修正案仍为雇主调查其员工是否存在不当行为留出了一定的空间。Waters v. Churchill案(1994年)(多数意见)(“只有超出合理范围的[调查]程序才会违反第一修正案,即便存在错误惩罚受保护言论的风险”);Gartenberg v. Cooper Union案(纽约南区法院,2025年)(即便属于受保护言论,也可能与判断“是否存在可诉的骚扰行为”相关)。伍德科克并未提及任何基于学校存在本身,或其可能造成的“品牌”或“声誉损害”而中止学校调查的先例。相反,他所依赖的两个先例其实很容易区分。

斯威齐诉新罕布什尔州案(1957年)是一起有着70年历史的先例,涉及州总检察长对一名教授与共产党及进步党关联的调查。该案与大学的运作、自主权或学术利益几乎毫无关联。相比之下,密歇根大学董事会诉尤因案(1985年)则有所不同。Fischer v. Thomas(第六巡回法院,2022年)一案同样与大学治理和学术言论的背景相去甚远。在那起针对执法行为的诉讼中,第六巡回法院阻止了一个州司法委员会在选举前夕向两名司法候选人发送“含糊且具有威胁性的信件”之后,对其提起正式诉讼。该判决并未探讨调查或其最终结论是否构成不利对待或报复行为……

第五,即便假设伍德科克能够证明其关于报复行为的主张有胜诉的可能,为获得临时禁令,他仍需证明存在不可弥补的损害,以及相对于第三方和公众而言的利益平衡状况。不可弥补的损害很可能至少需要体现出某种主观上的恐惧心理;否则法院就会质疑为何要采取行动以及“是否需要立即行动”……目前的记录几乎无法“识别出伍德科克未来本想发表但因担心未来言论可能面临起诉而未能说出的内容”。尽管有诸如此类的说法,称否则他会更多地谈论以色列和巴勒斯坦问题,但很难看出这次调查真的让伍德科克的言论变得谨慎起来。他提到了自己尚未提交给法律评论期刊的一篇题为《支持结束以色列存在的法律与经济学论据》的文章;自己名为“反犹太复国主义法律研究运动”的博客上发布的文章减少了;据称在推特上的活动也减少了。然而,伍德科克在社交媒体和邮件列表上的发文并未完全停止;在调查期间,他仍在X平台以及AALS的在线讨论组中发表文章,其中包括关于以色列问题的内容;他至少提起了四起诉讼,其中几起已被媒体报道;他还维护着一个网页,用于提供有关自己言论和诉讼的信息,并寻求支持。在没有更多证据的情况下,法院无法断定伍德科克在接下来的两周内会因恐惧而自我约束。

尽管判例法通常将第一修正案违规行为视为不可弥补的损害,这一倾向使得人们不宜过分重视这一因素,但就现有证据而言,伍德科克所提出的理由较为薄弱,这至少不利于自动或推定地授予禁令救济,以解决所谓의自我审查问题……

法院还指出了大学本身也有兴趣对伍德科克的言论发表意见:一项禁止校长对调查结果作出回应的禁令——即便按照伍德科克自己的标准——也只不过是用另一种方式来弥补一种可能存在的语论自由侵犯行为。正如任何法律教授所知,布兰代斯大法官曾指出,对于那些不受青睐的言论,其“补救措施”通常应该是更多的言论自由,而非进一步的压制。大学校长与法律教授一样,有权就此类具有公共和职业意义的问题进行表达——无论是私下还是公开。事实上,在这一过程中,他们两人都这样做了。卡皮卢托校长自身的言论自由权并非唯一存在冲突的利益。该大学在有序且迅速地处理这起备受关注的未决调查事项方面,也有自身的治理利益考量。参见尤因的观点:“学术自由不仅依赖于教师与学生之间独立且无拘无束的思想交流,……还依赖于学术机构自身的自主决策,尽管这种依赖有时并不一致。” “如果没有进行调查的能力,公共雇主将无计可施,也会失去‘在处理与雇员关系时的更大灵活性’。”鉴于这些相互关联的因素,法院认为,基于客观上的限制(涉及伍德科克在案件实质问题上的胜诉可能性)、主观上的限制(涉及在总统作出裁决之前伍德科克的言论可能造成的不可弥补的损害),以及公众和第三方希望学术调查能够有序且迅速结束的利益,均没有必要下达临时命令来重新审视法院此前的命令并具体限制总统的行事。需要明确的是,这项命令并未解决大学官员的过往行为是否构成违反《第一修正案》的报复行为这一问题——这是一个独立且具有追溯性的问题,根据《美国法典》第42编第1983条和第1988条,至少有可能获得赔偿及律师费(尽管被告方当然不认同这一点)。虽然这些历史事实对于伍德科克证明其主张胜诉的可能性是必要的,但即便这些事实得到证实,也仍不足以作为下达限制令的依据,因为限制令需要证明存在持续受限的言论表达情况。

此外,这项命令也未涉及伍德科克未来可能面临的任何纪律处分是否恰当的问题。如上所述,这些问题尚未成熟,需遵循各自的行政程序——第六巡回法院曾特别考虑过某种可能改变回避分析结果的程序……

12月3日仍将举行初步禁令听证会,为此法院要求就以下“有争议的事实问题”提交补充陈述材料。伍德科克“对涉及公共事务话题发表意见的兴趣”之性质,以及作为一所公立专业院校的该大学“通过其员工提升所提供公共服务效率的兴趣”之性质。

正在进行的调查、校长的调查结果以及后续处理措施可能在多大程度上压制一位具有“正常坚定立场”的教授的言论自由。

该调查或其起源过程中任何可能涉及《第一修正案》所规定的报复行为的异常或附带因素,包括伍德科克被禁止进入校园及教学任务被调整的依据。

该大学关于员工调查的任何政策或惯例,以及这些政策或惯例对本次调查及其附带后果的适用性。

原文

Some excerpts from the longish decision Friday by Judge Benjamin Beaton (E.D. Ky.) in Woodcock v. Capilouto:

This opinion addresses the latest chapter in the ongoing saga concerning Professor Ramsi Woodcock, his commentary regarding Israel and Palestine, and the University of Kentucky's investigation into whether he violated Title VI or the school's technology or conduct policies….

Earlier this month, this Court denied law professor Ramsi Woodcock's request to halt the University of Kentucky's ongoing investigation into several comments he made related to his views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and his 2025 "Petition for Military Action Against Israel." Woodcock's initial submissions had not persuasively shown that the investigation was retaliatory in its origin or chilling in its ongoing effect.

But the order set an evidentiary hearing two weeks later to address these fact-dependent questions and Woodcock's request for a preliminary injunction. The investigation—which had lasted more than a year and whose report was already overdue—could not "last forever" without threatening Woodcock's First Amendment rights. And the University of Kentucky's corresponding "reassignment" of Woodcock from teaching duties throughout the investigation was increasingly hard to justify, particularly given the absence of any articulated suspicion of classroom disruption….

Then, one week after the TRO decision, the outside investigator's 134-page sealed (for now) report finally landed. {That report is provisionally under seal pending the resolution of a motion to seal, which will be referred to a Magistrate Judge.} …

[Now], the Dean of the law school could decide whether to lift Woodcock's reassignment from teaching and restore him to the classroom for the spring semester. This could happen as late as mid-December, according to counsel, without prejudicing Woodcock's ability to teach…. [And] the University President could decide, based on the investigative report, whether (in his view) Woodcock violated any laws or policies….

The report and Woodcock's response have been published by the Kentucky Lantern (McKenna Horsley); Woodcock reports that this is because they were publicly filed in a parallel state case. The court had this to say about Woodcock's request for a temporary injunction to block any findings by the University President:

During previous hearings, this Court observed that Woodcock's effort to end his reassignment from teaching stood on firmer ground that his request to halt the investigation itself. That view rested largely on caselaw that contemplated speech-related investigations consistent with the First Amendment yet considered whether any attendant consequences of such investigations abridged those rights based on a retaliatory purpose, chilled speech, or both. {See generally, e.g., Sensabaugh v. Halliburton (6th Cir. 2019) (no adverse action based on "letter of guidance" and reprimand in the context of a "independent law firm" investigation involving "scores of documents and text messages" and "seventeen different witnesses"); Moore v. Garnand (9th Cir. 2023) ("[W]e never held that a retaliatory investigation alone could violate the First Amendment, as our holding rested on much more than just a retaliatory investigation[.]").} …

Woodcock insists that the First Amendment bars the President from spending "weeks poring over documents" unrelated to "any arguable policy violation." "Whatever the University decides about spring teaching, findings issued on the investigator's report would injure Woodcock irreparably on their own." To the extent that review entails an inquiry into his political beliefs, Woodcock contends, the process is illegitimate and should be enjoined immediately….

[But] a substantial body of caselaw indicates that a speech-related investigation alone generally doesn't amount to retaliation or adverse action. {See, e.g., Churchill v. Univ. of Colorado at Boulder (Colo. App. 2010) ("Courts have concluded that investigations alone are not adverse employment actions."); Sensabaugh (6th Cir. 2019) (concluding no adverse action even when context included a "painstakin[g] investigation"); Couch v. Board. of Trustees of Memorial Hospital of Carbon County (10th Cir. 2009) (investigation didn't amount to adverse action supporting First Amendment retaliation); Benningfield v. City of Houston (5th Cir. 1998) ("Although a reprimand can constitute an adverse employment action, an investigation does not[.]"); Moore ("[W]e have never held that a retaliatory investigation alone could violate the First Amendment"); Bell v. Sheriff of Broward County 1375 (11th Cir. 2021) ("[D]eputy Bell's five-day suspension with pay pending an investigation into his conduct is not an adverse action."). But as emphasized in the Court's previous TRO opinion, the caselaw in this area is hardly uniform and uncertainty remains about how different circuits might approach each specific factual scenario. See, e.g., Holt v. Pennsylvania (3d Cir. 2017) ("Our Circuit has not considered whether the initiation of an internal investigation can constitute an 'adverse action' for purposes of a First Amendment retaliation claim, and our sister circuits are split on the issue.").} The collateral consequences of an investigation, by contrast, may create an intolerable chill that could warrant judicial intervention. See, e.g., Levin v. Harleston (2d Cir. 1992); White v. Lee (9th Cir. 2000). The First Amendment leaves at least some room for employers to investigate their employees for perceived misconduct, even when the alleged offenses relate to speech. Waters v. Churchill (1994) (plurality op.) ("Only [investigative] procedures outside the range" of reasonableness violate First Amendment despite investigation's "risk of erroneously punishing protected speech."); Gartenberg v. Cooper Union (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (even protected speech may be relevant to determining "whether actionable harassment occurred").

Woodcock hasn't pointed to any precedent halting a school's investigation based only on its existence or the "brand" or "reputational harm" that it might produce. To the contrary, the two precedents on which he relies most heavily are easily distinguishable.

Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957), is a 70-year-old precedent concerning a state attorney general's investigation into a professor's affiliation with the Communist and Progressive Parties. It had little, if anything, to say about the operations, autonomy, or academic interests of a university. Contra, e.g., Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing (1985).

Fischer v. Thomas (6th Cir. 2022), likewise sits far afield from the context of university governance and academic speech. In that pre-enforcement challenge, the Sixth Circuit barred a state judicial commission from initiating formal proceedings against two judicial candidates after it "sen[t] vague and threatening letter to [the] candidates on the eve of election." The opinion didn't address whether an investigation or its concluding findings amounted to adverse action or retaliation….

Fifth, even assuming Woodcock could establish a likelihood of success on the merits of his retaliation claim, to obtain a TRO he'd have to show irreparable harm and the balance of the equities relative to third parties and the public. Irreparable harm likely requires at least some showing of subjective chill as well; otherwise a court would be left to wonder why and "whether it needs to act now." …

The current record does precious little to "identify speech that [Woodcock] wishes to make in the future but for the threat of prosecution of that future speech." Despite boilerplate assertions that he'd otherwise say and write more about Israel and Palestine, it's hardly clear that this investigation has chilled Woodcock's speech at all. He points to a paper called "A Law and Economics Argument for Ending Israel" that he hasn't yet submitted to the law reviews; diminished posting on his blog, called "the Antizionist Legal Studies Movement;" and allegedly decreased Twitter activity. Yet Woodcock's social-media and listserv posting hasn't stopped altogether; during this investigation he has continued to post on X and the AALS online discussion groups, including about Israel; he has filed at least four lawsuits, several of which have been covered in the press; he maintains a webpage supplying information about and soliciting support for his speech and litigation. Without further evidence, the Court cannot conclude that Woodcock will be chilled over the next two weeks.

Although the general tendency in the caselaw to treat First Amendment violations as irreparable harm cautions against assigning dispositive weight to this factor, the weakness of Woodcock's showing on the current record at least cuts against automatic or presumptive injunctive relief to ameliorate any purported self-censorship….

The court also pointed to the university's own interest in speaking about Woodcock's speech:

[A]n injunction barring the President from reacting to the investigator's findings would—even on Woodcock's own terms—remedy one arguable free-speech violation with another. As any law professor knows, Justice Brandeis taught that the "remedy" for disfavored speech should ordinarily be more speech—not additional suppression. A college president, just like a law professor, may presumptively speak—privately or publicly—about a matter of public and professional interest such as this. Indeed, both have done so during this process.

And President Capiluto's own speech rights aren't the only countervailing interests at issue. The University has its own governance interests in the orderly and prompt resolution of a high-profile pending investigation. See Ewing ("Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students, … but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself."). "Without this ability to investigate, a public employer would be left without recourse and would lose its 'greater leeway in its dealings with citizen employees.'"

Given these compounding considerations, the Court concluded that no temporary order revisiting the Court's prior orders and specifically restraining the President was warranted based on these allegations of objective chill (regarding Woodcock's likelihood of success on the merits), subjective chill (regarding any irreparable harm associated with Woodcock's speech pending the forthcoming presidential findings), or the public and third-party interest in an orderly and prompt conclusion to an academic investigation….

This order, to be clear, does not resolve whether the University officials' past actions constituted retaliation in violation of the First Amendment—a distinct and retrospective question, for which damages and attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1988 are at least potentially available (though the Defendants of course disagree). While those historical facts are necessary to Woodcock's showing of likelihood of success on the merits, even if proved they are not sufficient to warrant a restraining order, which requires a showing of ongoing chilled speech.

Nor does this order address the propriety of any discipline that Woodcock might eventually face. As described above, those questions haven't ripened and follow their own administrative process—one the Sixth Circuit specifically contemplated might alter the abstention analysis….

There will still be a preliminary injunction hearing on Dec. 3, and for it the court orders extra briefing on the following "disputed factual issues":

The nature of Woodcock's "interest in speaking on a matter of public concern" and the nature of the University's "interest 'in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees'" as a public professional school.

The extent to which the ongoing investigation, any presidential findings, and any subsequent process might chill the speech of a professor of "ordinary firmness."

Any unusual or ancillary aspects of the investigation or its origin that may bear on retaliation under the First Amendment, including the basis for Woodcock's campus ban and teaching reassignment.

Any University policies or customs governing employee investigations and their applicability to this investigation and its collateral consequences.